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Layered Rights: Robertson v. Thomson
Gregory R. Hagen†
In Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 1 the Supreme
Court of Canada (‘‘the Court’’) considered ‘‘whether
newspaper publishers are entitled as a matter of law to
republish in electronic databases freelance articles they
have acquired for publication in their newspapers —
without compensation to the authors and without their
consent’’. 2 Curiously, while deciding that publishers are
not entitled to reproduce the individual articles without
the consent of the freelancers, 3 it also held that the publishers do have a right to reproduce the articles in a CDROM database ‘‘as a part of those collective works —
their newspapers . . .’’ independently of whether the
scope of authorization of the freelancers extends to
reproduction in electronic databases. 4 The Court
observed that, at its core, the case concerned competing
layered rights of publishers in their newspaper, and freelancers in their articles contained in the newspaper. 5 In
this comment, however, the author argues that by
grounding the right of publishers to reproduce newspaper articles in their right to reproduce their newspapers — independently of the scope of the authorization
to reproduce the articles — the Court wrongly abandons
layered rights as they are ordinarily understood in the
Copyright Act. 6
The layering of copyrights is illustrated by the case
of the relationship between rights in works and rights in
other subject matter (the latter being so-called ‘‘related’’
or ‘‘neighbouring rights’’). 7 Rights exist in works under
section 3 of the Copyright Act and also in other subject
matter, namely, performers’ performances (ss. 15 & 26),
sound recordings (s. 18), and communications signals
(s. 21).
The layered nature of rights in copyright law results
from the fact that some subject matter of copyright is
layered. Subject matter is layered when its existence
depends upon the existence of other subject matter. For
example, the existence of a sound recording of a performance of a musical work obviously depends upon the
existence of the performance and of the work embodied
in it. Thus, one can think of the sound recording as,
metaphorically, layered over the work and the performer’s performance of the work.
Given the layering of subject matter, the exercise of
rights in sound recordings, performers’ performances,
and communications signals often necessarily involves

exercising other rights in the Copyright Act . For
example, when the sound recording of a musical work is
reproduced, the underlying work is also reproduced.
When that sound recording is performed in public, as
background music, for example, there is also a performance of the underlying work. 8
Layered copyrights are generally considered to be
independent of each other in the sense that the existence
of a right in one person does not imply the existence of
another right in that same person. Put another way,
copyrights at one layer are subject to copyrights at
another layer. For example, a maker’s right as specified in
section 18 of the Copyright Act to reproduce a sound
recording does not imply that the maker has the right
under section 3 of the Copyright Act to reproduce the
underlying work that is embodied in the sound
recording. As a result, the maker of the sound recording
cannot reproduce the sound recording, despite the
maker’s right of reproduction, without the authorization
of the owner of the right to reproduce the musical work
embodied in the sound recording. 9

Robertson can be understood as being about
whether the result regarding sound recordings analogously holds with respect to newspapers and the articles
contained in them; namely, whether a newspaper publisher can reproduce its newspaper in an electronic
database without the authorization of the owners of the
copyright in any articles contained in it. 10 The issue arose
because Robertson, a freelance writer, wrote two articles
that were published in the Globe and Mail and later
reproduced in three databases: Info Globe Online,
CPI.Q, and a CD-ROM. 11 No explicit terms regarding
copyright were agreed upon, either orally or in writing,
but it was conceded that Robertson authorized the publication of the articles in the print newspaper. 12 Robertson objected to the reproduction of her articles in the
databases, however, and instituted a class action on
behalf of all contributors to the Globe and Mail from
1944 and thereafter. 13 From the perspective of the Globe
and Mail, the reproduction of the articles in electronic
databases was grounded in the right to reproduce its
newspaper, which contained the articles. From the perspective of the freelance authors of the articles, the reproduction of the newspaper was a reproduction of the
articles, which was an infringement of the right to
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reproduce the articles held by the freelancers, such as
Robertson. 14
The Court found that a reproduction of the articles
in a CD-ROM was not an infringement 15 while the
reproduction of the articles in the other databases was an
infringement. 16 Importantly, the Court found that it was
the Globe and Mail’s right to reproduce its newspaper
(containing the articles) in the CD-ROM, 17 irrespective
of whether the reproduction of the articles in the CDROM was within the scope of Robertson’s authorization. 18 In arriving at this judgment, however, the Court
appears to have abandoned the idea that copyright in
newspapers is layered in the manner described above.
This abandonment of layering can be explained as
an attempt to reconcile the possession of copyrights in
the newspaper and copyrights in the articles contained
in the newspaper by distinct persons. The explanation
begins, first, by noting that the Court recognized the
existence of the two rights at issue:
Plainly, freelance authors have the right to reproduce,
and authorize the reproduction of, their articles. Similarly, as
the holders of the copyright in their newspapers, the Publishers are entitled to ‘‘produce or reproduce the work or
any substantial part thereof in any material form
whatever’’. 19

Second, the rights in newspapers are layered. This is
because a newspaper is both a collection and a compilation of the articles that it contains. ‘‘Compilation’’ is
defined as: 20
(a) a work resulting from the selection or arrangement
of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works or of parts
thereof, or (b) a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of data.

‘‘Collective work’’ is defined as:
(a) an encyclopaedia, dictionary, year book or similar
work, (b) a newspaper, review, magazine or similar periodical, and (c) any work written in distinct parts by different
authors, or in which works or parts of works of different
authors are incorporated. 21

Since newspapers are collections and compilations
of articles, arguably, the reproduction of the whole newspaper reproduces its articles. In fact, the Court recognized the layering of rights in newspapers and their articles as follows:
The Copyright Act establishes a regime of layered
rights. Freelance authors who write newspaper articles retain
the copyright in their work while the publisher of the newspaper acquires a copyright in the newspaper. 22

While this statement says merely that both authors and
newspaper publishers possess rights in their respective
works, clearly, the notion of layering suggests something
about the relationship between rights. Indeed, the Court
referred to the distinct rights in compilations and their
contents as ‘‘overlapping’’. 23 It is suggested that rights in
the newspaper and articles ‘‘overlap’’ or are ‘‘layered’’
because there cannot be a reproduction of the whole
newspaper without the reproduction of each of its article
parts. Hence, the right to reproduce the entire newspaper
cannot be exercised without also reproducing the articles

— which may be an exercise of a right held by someone
other than the publisher.
Third, the independence of copyrights holds that
the possession of one right does not imply the possession
of another right. Independence holds, for example, with
respect to the relationship of related rights and works.
Indeed, the independence of the rights in articles and the
newspaper in which they are contained is confirmed by
the Court:
Pursuant to the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42,
newspaper publishers own the copyright in their newspapers and have a right to reproduce a newspaper or a substantial part of that newspaper but do not have the right,
without the consent of the author, to reproduce individual
freelance articles. 24

It follows from the principle of independence that
the right of the publisher to reproduce the newspaper
does not imply the right to reproduce the articles contained in it, despite the fact that the articles must necessarily be reproduced when the newspaper is reproduced
(as a result of layering). The reproduction of the newspaper by the Globe and Mail without the authorization
of the owners of the underlying articles is, therefore, an
infringement of the rights of the owners of the copyrights in the articles. Nevertheless, the Court did not
draw this conclusion, for it also said that newspaper
publishers do have a limited right to publish the articles
in electronic databases included in their right to publish
the newspapers, irrespective of whether the authorization extends to reproduction in the databases:
Their copyright over the newspapers they publish gives
them no right to reproduce, otherwise than as part of those
collective works — their newspapers — the freelance articles
that appeared in them. 25

How can this finding be reconciled with the principles of layering and independence? It might appear that
the Court gives up the independence of layered rights.
On that account, the right to reproduce the underlying
articles is part of the right to reproduce the newspaper. 26
Yet, at the same time, the Court appears to give up the
principle of layered rights in the sense that, while there
may be a reproduction of the underlying articles when
reproducing the newspaper, it is not a reproduction that
is an exercise of the rights of the owners of the underlying articles. Hence, on this view, there is no violation of
independence of rights after all.
Not only does the judgment confirm the independence of rights, 27 but also, for much of the judgment the
Court describes how the right of reproduction is limited
by the form of reproduction. It follows on the Court’s
reasoning that a reproduction of the articles is not necessarily a reproduction, in any material form whatever, of
the newspaper. (Likewise, the reproduction of a newspaper may not be a reproduction in any material form of
the underlying articles.) If there can be a reproduction of
a work without it being a reproduction in any material
form, then there is an issue as to whether the databases
are a reproduction in any material form of the articles
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and/or of the newspaper. This is close to the fundamental question posed by the Court:
The real question then is whether the electronic
databases that contain articles from the Globe reproduce
the newspapers or merely reproduce the original articles. 28

The answer given by the Court is that it depends upon
whose originality is reproduced:
The answer to this question lies in the determination of
whose ‘‘originality’’ is being reproduced: the freelance
author’s alone or the Publishers’ as a collective work? 29

The notion of originality was recently clarified by
the Court in CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of
Upper Canada. 30 There it said that originality was a
quality of works that existed when they were produced
with the exercise of skill and judgment. 31 Further, originality in a compilation, such as a newspaper, exists only
in its form as an edited work rather than in the works
that it contains:
Copyright protects originality of form or expression. A
compilation takes existing material and casts it in different
form. The arranger does not have copyright in the individual components. However, the arranger may have copyright in the form represented by the compilation. 32

While there is clearly skill and judgment both in the
underlying articles and in the newspaper (since copyright subsists in both), the Court held that, in the case of
the Info Globe Online and CPI.Q databases, the originality of the newspaper had not been reproduced, but
that the originality of the articles had been reproduced. 33
The reason the originality of the newspaper is reproduced in the case of the CD-ROM is that it preserves a
linkage to the original newspaper. The Court said:

Specifically, the Court limited the right of reproduction to those reproduced articles that are not decontextualized to the point that they are no longer presented in
a manner that maintains their ‘‘intimate connection
with the rest of [the] newspaper’’. 36 This ‘‘intimacy’’,
‘‘nature’’, 37 or ‘‘essence’’ 38 must be preserved in order for
the right of reproduction to be applicable. 39 It argued
that the decontextualization of the articles in the Info
Globe Online and CPI.Q made them more like a collection of individual articles, a collection of a different
nature than a reproduction in the form of a newspaper:
We again agree with the Publishers that their right to
reproduce a substantial part of the newspaper includes the
right to reproduce the newspaper without advertisements,
graphs and charts, or in a different layout and using different
fonts. But it does not follow that the articles of the newspaper can be decontextualized to the point that they are no
longer presented in a manner that maintains their intimate
connection with the rest of that newspaper. In Info Globe
Online and CPI.Q, articles from a given daily edition of the
Globe are stored and presented in a database together with
thousands of other articles from different periodicals and
different dates. And, these databases are expanding and
changing daily as more and more articles are added. These
products are more akin to databases of individual articles
rather than reproductions of the Globe. Thus, in our view,
the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced; the
originality of the newspapers is not. 40

The Court found, in contrast, that the reproduction
of the newspaper in the CD-ROM did preserve the
essence of the work, since it is essentially a compendium
of daily newspaper editions. 41

As noted, in determining whether there was a substantial reproduction in this case, the Court placed
importance upon the fact that section 3 of the Copyright
Act defines ‘‘copyright’’ in a work as the ‘‘. . . sole right to
produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part
thereof in any material form whatever . . .’’. The Court
interpreted ‘‘in any material form’’ as denying that anything can be done with the work once converted into
electronic form. Thus, instead of interpreting the reproduction right as unlimited, it imposed limits on it:

This analysis may explain why, according to the
Court, the originality of the newspaper was not reproduced in the Info Globe and CPI.Q databases but was
reproduced in the CD-ROM. It does not explain, however, why the originality of the articles is not reproduced
in the CD-ROM, while it was reproduced in the case of
the Info Globe and CPI.Q databases. Yet the Court said
that the ‘‘real question’’ in Robertson was whose originality was being reproduced rather than whether there
was authorization to reproduce the articles in the
databases. 42 A finding that the originality of the articles is
not reproduced in the case of the CD-ROM would be
problematic, however, because it indicates that the Court
does not view the rights in newspapers as being layered
over the rights in works. For, in the majority’s view, the
reproduction of the newspaper does not necessarily
reproduce in any material form whatever, the underlying
articles. This would save the independence of copyright,
but how can it be?

Media neutrality is reflected in s. 3(1) of the Copyright
Act which describes a right to produce or reproduce a work
‘‘in any material form whatever’’. Media neutrality means
that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different
media, including more technologically advanced ones. But
it does not mean that once a work is converted into electronic data anything can then be done with it. The resulting
work must still conform to the exigencies of the Copyright
Act. Media neutrality is not a license to override the rights of
authors — it exists to protect the rights of authors and
others as technology evolves. 35

Of course, there are situations where one could
reproduce a substantial part of the newspaper but not
the underlying articles, as in the case where the layout of
the newspaper is produced without the articles. There
could also be circumstances where a substantial part of
the newspaper is reproduced, but only an insubstantial
part of one or more articles is reproduced. But how
could it be said that the entire newspaper was reproduced (minus, perhaps, as in this case, some advertise-

In our view, the CD-ROMs are a valid exercise of the
Globe’s right to reproduce its collective works (or a substantial part thereof) pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act.
The CD-ROMs, like Info Globe Online and CPI.Q, do not
contain advertisements, pictures or colour and are presented
in a different medium and format than the print edition.
The critical distinction, however, is that the CD-ROMs preserve the linkage to the original daily newspaper. 34
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ments, graphic elements, daily information, birth and
death notices, and some design elements) but that the
originality of the articles was not reproduced? Given
layered rights, doesn’t the reproduction of a compilation
necessarily involve reproducing the original underlying
works?
The minority believed that it did:
The right of reproduction adheres equally to the benefit of authors of individual works and to those of collective
works or compilations. In considering the publisher’s right
of reproduction, the majority says that the line between the
rights of individual authors and the rights of authors of
collective works should be drawn on the basis of whose
originality is being reproduced. This suggests that the
databases in question reproduce only one group’s originality. This, with respect, seems to me to contradict the
essence of collective works and compilations, which inherently contain the ‘‘originality’’ of both the authors of individual works as well as of the creator of the collective work
or compilation. Any reproduction of a collective work will
necessarily involve the reproduction of both sets of originality. 43

The majority did not directly respond to the
minority counter-argument apart from its assertion that
the originality of the newspaper was not reproduced in
any material form whatever in the Info Globe and CPI.Q
databases. This is not surprising, since the skill and judgment embodied in the articles is necessarily reproduced
when the entire newspaper is reproduced. Interpreting
the majority’s reasoning charitably, however, one could
maintain that the fact that the originality of the newspaper was not reproduced in the case of the Info Globe
and CPI.Q databases was the reason there was no exercise of the right of reproduction with respect to the
newspapers, but that the same reason does not account
for the determination that there was no exercise of the
right of reproduction with respect to the underlying articles in the CD-ROM.
To attempt to explain the determination that there
is no exercise of the reproduction right with respect to
the articles on such an account, one could apply the
Court’s interpretation of ‘‘in any material form whatever’’
to limit the reproduction right in the articles. On such an

account, it might be said that the right of reproduction
of the freelancers in their articles could be narrowed in a
different way than is the right of reproduction of publishers in their newspapers and other collective works
and compilations. One view is that only the initial reproduction of the individual articles in a newspaper would
be an exercise of the right to reproduce the articles.
Subsequent reproduction of a newspaper would be an
exercise only of the publisher’s right to reproduce, and
not the right of the owner of the copyright in an article.
Hence, the publisher’s right to reproduce the newspaper
with the articles contained in it does not exercise a freelance author’s right to reproduce the articles since that
right had already been exercised by the author. Unfortunately, this result is unsatisfactory. While it may preserve
the independence of rights of newspaper publishers and
the owner of the copyright in the articles, it does so at
the expense of the layering of rights as ordinarily understood. 44
There is a better rationale for why the reproduction
of the articles in the CD-ROM in Robertson v. Thomson
was not an infringement than the one just considered. It
is this. Robertson impliedly authorized the Globe and
Mail to reproduce her articles in its newspaper. 45 The
issue, then, is whether the scope of the authorization
extended to reproduction in the electronic databases. 46
Since the Globe and Mail in the CD-ROM is a newspaper, or at least retains the nature or essence of the
Globe and Mail newspaper, 47 and Robertson authorized
reproduction of her articles in the Globe and Mail newspaper, by implication she authorized the reproduction of
her articles in the CD-ROM. In short, the Globe and
Mail’s right to reproduce its newspaper does not include
the right to reproduce the articles contained in it, but
there has been no infringement because the reproduction of the articles was authorized by Robertson. This
solution to the issue in Robertson does not depend upon
a supposed failure of the originality of the articles to be
reproduced in the CD-ROM and maintains both the
independence of copyrights and their layered nature.
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